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 V. ABSTRACT 
 
BACKGROUND:  
Stereochemistry is often used in the development of drugs. Enantiomers of a chiral 
drug are two non-superimposable mirror images of the molecule and a racemic 
mixture consists of equal quantities of both enantiomers. This study looks at the 
phenomenon of “chiral switching” where a molecule previously developed and 
marketed by an innovator company as a racemate medicine is later developed and 
launched as a single enantiomer. Drug utilization and market share data of three 
molecules that underwent chiral switching were investigated retrospectively to 
determine the clinical and economic impact of these occurrences in the private South 
African pharmaceutical market. 
 
METHOD:  
Unit sales and rand sales data of the racemate (and its generics) and the single 
enantiomer of three drug substance pairs, namely omeprazole-esomeprazole, 
citalopram-escitalopram and cetirizine-levocetirizine were gathered a year preceding 
the launch of the single enantiomer to three years subsequent to the launch of the 
single enantiomer onto the private market.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS: 
Descriptive statistical analysis included plotting trend lines of the annual unit and 
rand sales of both the racemate (and its generics) and the single enantiomer 
products during the study period,  pie charts illustrating the year on year differences 
in market share (in both unit sales and rand value of sales) as well as box and 
whisker plots of the racemate and its generics plotted for the year before the single 
enantiomer was launched, the year after its launch, two years after launch and three 
years after launch.  
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 The probability of the enantiomer being prescribed/ sold instead of the racemate at 
different time points was also calculated to determine whether the drug utilization of 
the single enantiomer increased or decreased from introduction until three years 
subsequent to its launch. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
Results were consistent with global literature indicating that “chiral switching’ is a 
successful strategy employed by innovator companies to extend their market share. 
Drug utilization of the single enantiomer generally showed an upward trend following 
its launch indicating that there is a perceived belief of enhanced clinical outcomes for 
the patient. There are, however, many other influencing factors such as pricing 
strategies, prescription status, marketing efforts to physicians and/or consumers and 
patent challenges specific to each market that make it difficult to draw a general 
conclusion from the case studies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Chirality is defined by McConathy and Owens (2003) as the geometric characteristic 
of a drug or molecule of not being superimposable on its mirror image. The two 
mirror images of the chiral molecule are known as enantiomers. A racemate consists 
of equal quantities of both enantiomers of the chiral drug. 
Chirality is an important consideration in the pharmaceutical industry as it has 
implications on the pharmacology of drug molecules by introducing selectivity and 
often specificity of drug action (Tucker, 2000). 
The thalidomide tragedy that occurred in the 1950’s is a well-known example that 
highlights the importance of chirality in medicines. Thalidomide was considered to be 
a fairly safe sedative, but foetal abnormalities saw it being withdrawn from the 
market. Investigative studies yielded interesting results: only the (S)-enantiomer was 
responsible for the teratogenic effects. Sedative effects were dependent on 
concentrations of the (R)-enantiomer.  
It was believed the disaster could have been averted had the pure (R)-enantiomer 
been administered instead of the racemate, however research has since showed 
that there is rapid interconversion of the thalidomide enantiomers in vivo making 
enantioselectivity nearly impossible (Waldeck, 2003). 
Perhexiline is another compound that illustrates how different enantiomers of the 
same compound can influence the safety and efficacy of a medicine. Perhexiline was 
an anti-angina medicine introduced by Richardson–Merrell Pharmaceuticals in the 
late 1960s into the French market followed by other countries including the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Although effective in treating angina, severe 
cases of hepatotoxicity and neurotoxicity were reported from the use of perhexiline 
and it was subsequently withdrawn from many markets by the late 1980’s. It 
continues to be used in Australia and New Zealand under strict patient care 
(Ashrafian et al, 2007). Pharmacokinetic studies undertaken by Gould et al (1986) 
into perhexiline which consists of a racemic mixture of (+) and (-) enantiomers 
revealed that the (-)-perhexiline was metabolized more slowly than (+)-perhexiline by 
the CYP enzymes in the liver thereby causing hepatoxicity.  
Most regulatory authorities are cognisant of the significance of enantiomers when 
developing medicines, South Africa being no different. The regulatory Biostudies 
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guidelines (Medicines Control Council, 2011) issued by the South African health 
authority, the Medicines Control Council (MCC), addresses the issue of the 
registration of enantiomers and racemates by recommending the following: 
(1) measurement of the individual enantiomers for bioavailability studies 
(2) measurement of the racemate using an achiral assay for bioequivalence 
testing   
(3) measurement of individual enantiomers only if: 
- different pharmacodynamics characteristics are demonstrated by the 
enantiomers 
- different pharmacokinetic characteristics are demonstrated by the 
enantiomers 
- the minor enantiomer is responsible for the primary safety and efficacy 
properties 
- non-linear absorption occurs for at least one of the enantiomers 
(change in concentration of enantiomer ratio according to input rate of 
drug or Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API).  
The introduction of a single enantiomer based pharmaceutical medicine of an 
already marketed racemic mixture is known as “chiral switching” (Hutt and 
Valentova, 2003). 
Clinical and pharmacological comparisons between the single enantiomer drug 
product and its racemic mixture (and/ or similar medicines in its drug class) are 
commonly found in the literature. Authors such as Birkett (1989) and Ariën (1984) 
are wholly in favour of single enantiomer drugs over racemates. Birkett (1989) states 
that “balance will gradually change to a situation where enantiomerically pure drugs 
will be the standard”. Other authors such as Hutt and Valentova (2003) and Tucker 
(2000), give a more balanced view on the topic, citing not only examples of 
successful cases where there were clinical and safety advantages of single 
enantiomers over their racemates but also examples of single enantiomers that 
failed to provide an advantage over their racemate.  In contrast, Mansfield et al 
(2004) is not in favour of single enantiomers, seeing no significant clinical advantage 
over the racemic drugs. 
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A drug utilization review can be used to ascertain whether the possible increase in 
efficacy and patient safety of the single enantiomer drug product has an impact on 
prescribing/usage trends. 
Besides the positive clinical perspective on this subject, chiral switching is also used 
as a strategy employed by innovator pharmaceutical companies to prolong the 
economic life-cycle of a particular molecule.  
This study combines drug utilization reviews and market share information to 
determine the impact of the introduction of an enantiomer of an already marketed 
racemic pharmaceutical product in a South African context.  
Three diverse racemate-enantiomer drug pairs were analysed: 
(1) omeprazole and esomeprazole – a prescription only gastro-intestinal medicine 
(2) citalopram and escitalopram – a prescription only medicine prescribed for 
depressive disorders 
(3) cetirizine and levocetirizine – an anti-allergic medicine that is available without 
prescription or OTC (over-the-counter). 
The importance of conducting such a study was to ascertain whether the single 
enantiomer of the racemate was perceived as more clinically beneficial as 
extrapolated from its utilization in practice as opposed to the original racemic 
mixture. Additionally, the investigation of the economic impact of the introduction of 
the single enantiomer on the innovator pharmaceutical company and its competitors 
adds to local knowledge on drug costing, consequent usage and impact on health 
care.  
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2. DEFINITIONS 
Stereoisomers 
Stereoisomers refer to molecules that are identical with regards to the chemical 
bonds the atoms share, but differ in how they are arranged spatially.  (Brown et al, 
2003) 
 
Enantiomers 
Enantiomers, also known as optical isomers, are molecules that are non- 
superimposable mirror images of each other.  A molecule that cannot be 
superimposed on its mirror image is said to be chiral. Each enantiomer is optically 
active - if one rotates polarized light (light waves vibrating in a single plane) 
clockwise (R), the other enantiomer will rotate polarized light in a counter clockwise 
(S) direction (Brown et al, 2003). 
 
 Racemate 
A mixture containing equivalent amounts of the two enantiomers is called a racemate 
and is optically inactive (Brown et al, 2003). 
 
Market share:  
Market share is defined by Howie and Kleczyk (2008) as the prescribing volume of a 
particular product group or brand expressed as a percentage of a defined total 
market. 
 
Patent 
A patent is a property right granted by an independent state to the inventor of an 
invention that is novel (not disclosed previously anywhere in the world), nonobvious 
(not obvious to a person ordinarily skilled in the field involved) and useful (Lehman, 
2003). 
  
Drug Utilisation Review (DUR) 
The WHO defines drug utilisation as “the marketing, distribution, prescription, and 
use of drugs in a society, with special emphasis on the resulting medical, social and 
economic consequences” (WHO, 2003). 
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A retrospective DUR uses data that is collected and analysed after the prescription, 
dispensing, and use of medicines has occurred.  These studies serve to identify 
trends in prescribing practices (Truter, 2008). 
 
Innovator  
An innovator product is the original drug product that has been developed by a 
pharmaceutical company. The innovator company is a holder of a patent preventing 
its molecule / formulation/ manufacture to be marketed by another company for a 
certain period of time. 
 
Generic  
A generic medicine or an interchangeable multisource medicine is defined by the 
Medicines and Related Substance Act 101 of 1965 (as amended) as containing “the 
same active substances which are identical in strength or concentration, dosage 
form and route of administration and meet the same or comparable standards, which 
comply with the requirements for therapeutic equivalence as prescribed”.  
 
Single Exit Price (SEP) 
All pharmaceutical companies in South Africa are mandated to sell their products at 
one set price to all customers. 
 
This transparent pricing system was introduced by means of Government Gazette in 
November 2005 which provides the following definition of the single exit price: “The 
price set by the manufacturer or importer of a medicine or Scheduled substance in 
terms of these regulations combined with the logistics fee and VAT and is the price 
of the lowest unit of the medicine or Scheduled substance within a pack multiplied by 
the number of units in the pack.” (Department of Health, 2005) 
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3. BACKGROUND  
 
3.1 Clinical Pharmacology of Racemates and Enantiomers. 
Stereochemistry is an essential aspect to consider when developing drugs. The 
interaction that occurs between a drug and a biological system is initially 
stereospecific - beginning a sequence of events that ultimately leads to a certain 
measurable physiological response (Burke and Henderson, 2002). 
The stereospecificity of biological receptors means that each enantiomer of a chiral 
drug may interact with the binding site in its own unique manner. This can lead to 
differences that can have either beneficial or detrimental consequences to the 
pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetic properties of the drug. 
These differences are illustrated in Figure 1 below. The active enantiomer is spatially 
arranged so that part A of the molecule aligns with site a of the drug receptor, part B 
with site b and part C with site c and is therefore pharmacologically active. The 
simultaneous alignment of all parts of the molecule with their corresponding binding 
site is not achieved in the inactive enantiomer – preventing a biological effect 
(McConathy and Owens, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1: Interactional differences between two hypothetical enantiomers and their drug binding sites 
(McConathy and Owens, 2003) 
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 However, as Caldwell (1992) points out, there are instances where the chiral centre 
is relatively uninvolved with the interaction occurring at the binding site and therefore 
the drug receptor does not differentiate between two enantiomers of the chiral drug.   
According to Agranat and Caner (1999), there are four possible reasons why pure 
enantiomers are more beneficial than racemates: 
(1) a total dosage reduction could be achieved using a single enantiomer as 
opposed the racemate, 
(2) a less complex dose-response relationship can be accomplished, 
(3) patient variability with regard to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamics 
properties could be decreased, 
(4) reduction in toxicity of the inactive enantiomer is possible.  
Caldwell (1992) advises that the decision of whether an enantiomer pure drug versus 
its racemate would be more beneficial must be made on a case by case basis. 
Criteria to consider include: 
(1) The pharmacological and therapeutic advantage the enantiomer would 
provide. Studies should be conducted to measure the activity of each 
enantiomer at the binding site. The metabolic and pharmacokinetic profiles 
should be fully characterized as this could have implications for toxicity. 
(2) Ease of technically synthesizing enantiomer pure drug and how economical it 
would be. The methods and techniques to isolate enantiomers vary for each 
drug and can include chromatography, electrophoresis and crystallization. 
Most methods are intrinsically expensive, consume high amounts of organic 
solvents and can be time-consuming. Costs of equipment, materials, recycling 
and manpower as well as the environmental impact need to be taken into 
consideration (Carvalho et al, 2006). 
(3) Difficulty in extrapolating animal data to humans. This can be attributed to a 
multitude of differences in the genetic make-up of humans, high selectivity 
when choosing the test experimental population and laboratory test situations 
that do not reflect man and his environment adequately. 
(4) Possible marketing opportunities. This could include marketing an enantiomer 
pure drug as having a safer, more tolerable profile or enhanced activity. 
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A short introduction to the racemate-enantiomer drug molecules that will be 
analysed in this study follows: 
 
3.1.1 Omeprazole to Esomeprazole 
 
Figure 2: Stereochemistry of Omeprazole and Esomeprazole (Olbe et al, 2003). 
 
Possibly the most successful chiral switch to take place was derived from 
omeprazole, manufactured by the Swedish pharmaceutical company Astra AB (now 
known as AstraZeneca following a merger with UK company Zeneca in 1999) and 
launched in South Africa in 1990. 
Omeprazole is a Proton Pump Inhibitor (PPI) that effectively inhibits the secretion of 
acid from the parietal cells in the stomach. Omeprazole is a racemate consisting of 
both R- and S- enantiomers. Esomeprazole – the S enantiomer – was found to be 
superior due to its pharmacokinetic properties (Olbe et al, 2003) and launched in 
2001 into the South African market by AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd. Both 
isomers are, however, equally effective in inhibiting acid secretion at the parietal-cell 
level as they are both converted to an identical achiral sulphonamide which inhibits 
the H+K+ ATPase proton pump (Kendall, 2003). 
Pharmacokinetic studies conducted on esomeprazole by Andersson et al (2001) 
show that esomeprazole is metabolized more slowly than the (R)-isomer resulting in 
a less variable, higher bioavailability of esomeprazole when compared to the same 
dose of omeprazole. There was also less inter-individual variability in the AUC when 
using esomeprazole as compared to omeprazole.    
Richter et al (2001) conducted a randomized, double-blind, 8 week study in 2 425 
patients with erosive oesophagitis to compare esomeprazole to omeprazole. The 
results showed that esomeprazole had greater efficacy than omeprazole in treating 
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GERD (Gastro Esophogeal Reflux Disease) – 93.7 % of patients were healed with 
esomeprazole by week 8 as opposed to 84.2 % of patients on omeprazole therapy (p 
< 0.001). 
A randomized, crossover study done by Röhss et al (2002) comparing 40 mg of 
esomeprazole compared to 40 mg of omeprazole (twice the standard dose) also 
demonstrated esomeprazole has superior acid suppressant effect in patients with 
GERD. 
 
3.1.2 Citalopram to Escitalopram 
 
Figure 3: Stereochemistry of Citalopram and Escitalopram (Smith, 2009) 
 
Citalopram is a selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitor (SSRI) used for the treatment 
of depression and anxiety disorders. It is the original racemic mixture manufactured 
and marketed by Lundbeck Pharmaceuticals as CIPRAMIL® since 2001. 
Escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) was later launched in 2004 by Lundbeck 
Pharmaceuticals, the same innovator company of the original racemate CIPRAMIL®. 
Escitalopram is the active S-enantiomer of the racemate, citalopram, and 
demonstrates superior selective serotonin reuptake inhibition (Baumann et al, 2001). 
A possible basis for this superior activity of escitalopram has been suggested by 
Sanchez et al (2004), who, after reviewing pharmacological and non-clinical 
literature, concluded that the R-enantiomer in the citalopram antagonistically 
occupies the binding site located on the serotonin transporter protein. The enhanced 
clinical effect that is observed could be the result of the removal of this inhibition.  
Other reasons that favour escitalopram when compared to citalopram have been 
summarised by Leonard and Taylor (2010) as follows: 
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• Escitalopram allosterically modulates the serotonin reuptake transporter 
(SERT) leading to superior pharmacological potency. 
• Metabolism of the R-enantiomer in citalopram occurs more gradually in 
comparison to the S-enantiomer. This leads to almost double the plasma 
concentration of the (R)-enantiomer, the accumulation of which is undesirable. 
• Functional antagonism of the (R)-enantiomer on escitalopram occurs. The 
higher occupancy of the (R)-enantiomer at target sites prevents escitalopram 
from binding and leads to a reduction in activity. 
• A quicker onset of action of escitalopram is possible as there is a faster 
desensitization of autoreceptors resulting in an augmented serotonin release. 
A rapid onset of action is clinically beneficial as there will be faster symptom 
control. 
A meta-analysis of seven comparative randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that 
directly compared escitalopram and citalopram in depression was conducted by 
Trkulja (2010).  The RCTs (all double bind, parallel grouped) involved out-patients 
that were mainly younger, healthy adults free of any other psychopathology and 
were conducted at multiple centres in different locations. Montgomery-Asberg 
depression rating scale (MADRS) scores at different evaluation time-points were 
compared.  The author concluded that there was little evidence of significant clinical 
advantage of escitalopram versus citalopram on an equimolar basis for the short to 
medium term treatment of major depression.  
The subject of intensive debate is whether any anti-depressant drug is superior to 
the placebo effect. Kirsch and Sapirstein (1998) conducted a meta-analysis on 
published literature and concluded that the effect of the placebo accounted for twice 
as much as the drug effect. Kirsch et al (2008) conducted a similar meta-analysis 
using clinical trial data submitted to the FDA on four new generation anti-
depressants in order to eliminate any publication bias. They found minor statistically 
significant superiority of anti-depressants over the placebo but maintained that due 
to the small effect size this result was still clinically insignificant (Kirsch, 2008). 
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3.1.3 Cetirizine to Levocetirizine 
  
Figure 4: Stereochemistry of Cetirizine (Lewis et al, 2004) and Levocetirizine (Tillemant et al, 2003) 
Cetirizine is an antihistamine, a potent H1-receptor antagonist, used for the treatment 
of allergic rhinitis as well as urticarial conditions. It was launched by the Belgian 
Pharmaceutical company, UCB Pharma, as ZYRTEC® in 1994. Cetirizine is the 
racemic mixture of (R)-levocetirizine and (S)-dextrocetirizine. 
Levocetirizine, the pharmacologically active R-enantiomer, was later registered and 
marketed by GlaxoSmithKline (Pty) Ltd (GSK) as XYZAL®. 
Pharmacological characteristics of the racemate, cetirizine, were compared to 
levocetirizine by Telliment et al (2003) and are discussed below: 
• Levocetirizine demonstrates an increased affinity to the H1 receptor and is 
considered to be the more pharmacologically active enantiomer (also known 
as the eutomer) compared to dextrocetirizine.  
• Slightly higher plasma protein binding of levocetirizine could be responsible 
for the observed low volume distribution in the body as opposed to 
dextrocetirizine. This low volume of distribution decrease the amount of drug 
that is exposed to organs where toxic effects may be elicited, making 
levocitirizine more beneficial in terms of safety and efficacy, reducing the risk 
of dose-dependent toxicity and interindividual variation of therapeutic effect.  
• The low volume of distribution also decreases the risk of possible drug-drug 
interactions (Telliment et al, 2003). 
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A study conducted by Baltes et al (2001) showed that the pharmacokinetic properties 
of levocetirizine were superior compared to dextrocetirizine due to higher plasma 
AUC (this reflects the actual exposure of the body to the drug after administration of 
the drug) and Cmax (the maximum concentration the drug achieves in the test area 
after the first dose). Levocetirizine also demonstrated a longer half-life (time required 
for the drug to fall to half the value it was at the beginning of the time period) and 
lower volume of distribution (the distribution of drug between the plasma and the rest 
of the body tissue) in comparison to dextrocetirizine.  A significantly lower non-renal 
clearance of levocetirizine was also observed which could result in decreased 
metabolism based drug interactions. 
 
3.2 The Pharmaceutical Industry and Patents 
According to the Patents Act No. 57 of 1978 (as amended) of South Africa a patent 
“may be granted for any new invention that involves an inventive step and is capable 
of being used in trade, industry or agriculture”. 
South Africa is a signatory to the 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement by the WTO (World Trade Organization) which 
aims to standardize the protection of intellectual property rights across member 
nations including the patenting of pharmaceuticals (Subhan J, 2006). 
The governments of participating countries are obligated to meet the following 
general principles: 
- patent protection should be provided to both product and process, 
allowing certain exceptions 
-  the period of patent protection should last for 20 years from the date it 
was filed 
- there should be non-discrimination in terms of the place of invention, 
whether products are locally or internationally produced or regarding 
the field of technology 
- the product or process must meet the three criteria of novelty, non-
obviousness and industrial applicability 
- disclosure of details of the invention of the patent must be made in the 
application filed and be made public (WTO, 2006). 
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Subhan (2006) mentions two provisions of the TRIPs agreement that could be 
utilized should there be a public crisis: 
(1) Compulsory licencing where a member government is authorized to grant a 
licence to a party capable of producing the invention under patent without the 
consent of that patent holder – after reasonable attempts to seek a voluntary 
licence from the patent holder. 
(2) Parallel importation which allows the South African government to import 
medicines under patent without authorization from the patent holder into the 
country should the price be lower elsewhere.  
Patents in the pharmaceutical industry are often a controversial topic and there are 
many differing opinions on the matter.  
Craig and Malek (1995) have presented both sides of the argument.  Their 
observation is that innovator pharmaceutical companies have been accused of 
abusing the patent protection system by creating oligopoly markets and charging 
exorbitant prices for life-saving medication. The high-risk Research and 
Development (R&D) that pharmaceutical companies have to sustain is also 
recognized by the authors. Research and development of medicines is fundamental 
to the pharmaceutical industry and incurs tremendous expenditure in order to ensure 
that safe, efficacious medicines of a good quality are introduced on the market. In 
order to protect their intellectual property, companies patent their active drug 
substance, formulations and processes. This prevents other (generic) companies – 
albeit only for a certain amount of time- from copying their intellectual property and 
manufacturing the same product at a cheaper price. 
Bruce Lehman (2003), president of the International Intellectual Property Institute 
maintains that an effective patent protection is important, especially in developing 
countries, as it drives the development of life-saving medication. Although the 
important role of research funded by the public sector is acknowledged, the author is 
of the opinion that the profit incentive offered through pharmaceutical companies has 
been the most significant driver of advances in medical science – more than 92% of 
new medicines were developed by patent dependant pharmaceutical companies by 
the 1980’s. 
Many ‘blockbuster’ drugs – most notably Lipitor® (atorvastatin; Pfizer), Zocor ® 
(simvastatin; Merck), Seroquel® (queitapine; AstraZeneca) – have come off patent, 
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and its detrimental effects to the company’s bottom line have been widely published. 
Authors such as Cutler (2007) and Ledford (2011) are of the opinion that the 
‘blockbuster’ model is not sustainable and its time has passed. Harrison (2011) and 
Service (2004) predict that new strategies employed by innovator companies include 
focusing on drugs that are being tailored genetically to patients being treated for 
certain conditions (pharmacogenomics), reformulating existing products into 
extended release or different dosage forms and mergers and acquisitions with other 
research companies to boost drying pipelines. 
Hudson (2000) analysed the impact of generics in the pharmaceutical market post-
expiration of patents in four countries: United States, United Kingdom, Germany and 
Japan. The findings of this study are in line with previous research in this field and 
confirm that there is a considerably negative impact on the sales of the original brand 
after entry of its generics on the market especially if the product was successful and 
had a large market presence. 
The analysis also showed, however, that the value of the patent still continued after 
its expiration as there was a lag between patent expiry and generic entry and during 
this period the branded product still held its market share.  The loss in sales and 
market share did not occur instantaneously but rather over a period of time. 
Correa (2011) who undertook a study regarding the patent system in five developing 
countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India and South Africa believes that the 
patent system, particularly in South Africa hampers public access to affordable 
medicines. It was found that the patent system in South Africa differed to the other 
four countries as patents are issued without substantive examination. Unlike the 
other countries, South Africa merely registers patents without verifying if it meets the 
requirements for patentability. Another observation was that there is an increase of 
“minor, incremental innovations” to existing drugs (formulation, salt, dosage forms, 
polymorphs) that serves to extend the exclusivity of their medicine, thereby denying 
generic companies the opportunity to provide cheaper and better access to 
medicines in these developing countries. 
These issues have recently been addressed in a draft National Policy on Intellectual 
Property which was issued for public comment in September 2013 by the 
Department of Trade and Industry. The policy aims to introduce patent examination 
as well as strengthen patent criteria making it difficult to combine previously existing 
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drugs or adding new indications to medicines currently on the market. Pre- and post- 
oppositions to patent grants could also be allowed under the new legislation 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2013).  It is a topic of heated debate between 
public health activists and innovator drug companies in South Africa and the 
outcome will have a great impact on the future of healthcare and the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
The economic rationale for the strategy of introducing the pure enantiomer form of 
the product into the market is that the new, improved drug can be launched and 
marketed before the patent for the racemate expires – thereby curtailing the success 
of generic forms of the racemate that will be launched after patent expiry. The 
market share of the innovator drug is therefore retained in spite of developing 
generic pressure of the racemate.  
Enantiomer patents are often termed “selection patents” as the single enantiomer is 
derived from the basic patent of the racemate. Enantiomer patents are often 
challenged on their ‘inventiveness’ – the enantiomer should exhibit pharmacological 
and/or pharmacokinetic properties that are superior to both the racemate and its 
corresponding inactive enantiomer at a ratio exceeding 2:1 (Agranat and 
Wainschtein, 2010). This potency ratio between the most active enantiomer (the 
eutomer) and the less active enantiomer (the distomer), is also known as the 
eudismic ratio. The ‘Pfeiffer rule’ proposes that the lower the effective dose for a 
racemic medicine, the greater the difference in the pharmacological effect of the 
optical isomers (Waldeck, 2003). 
Metzke (2010) refers to the subject of enantiomer patenting as “product hopping” 
that is used by companies to “allow unjustified extensions of market exclusivity” and 
challenges the validity of these patents based on the obviousness criteria. 
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3.3 Private versus Public Healthcare Markets in South Africa 
South Africa’s healthcare industry is made up of the state funded public sector and 
the private sector where consumers pay with their own earnings, either in cash or 
through their medical aid.  
Medicines for the public sector are sourced from the pharmaceutical industry through 
the issuing of government tenders for drugs listed on the EDL (Essential Drugs List). 
It is important to note that Single Exit Price (SEP) does not apply to tenders and 
tender prices will therefore vary. Medicines on the EDL are intended to address the 
most prevalent diseases in the population and generics are widely favoured due to 
the decreased cost. Single enantiomer drugs do not normally feature as they are 
considered too expensive. 
According to IMS data used in the May 2012 Focus report on Pharmaceuticals in 
South Africa; the Total Pharmaceutical Market was valued at more than R25 billion in 
November 2011. 
The private market is characterized by pharmaceutical companies selling their 
products to various distributors and then pharmacies at the Single Exit Price (SEP) 
from which consumers will ultimately buy their medication for cash or through their 
medical aid. The SEP is adjusted annually by the Minister on recommendation of the 
Pricing Committee. The percentage increase is based on the average Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) from the preceding year and foreign exchange rate (Department of 
Health, 2006). The SEP is then communicated to the pharmaceutical industry by 
Government Gazette. 
This study is based on pharmaceutical sales in the private sector only. 
 
4. AIM 
To investigate the impact of the introduction of an enantiomer of an already 
marketed racemic pharmaceutical product on drug utilization and market share in the 
private South African pharmaceutical market. 
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5. OBJECTIVES  
The impact of the single enantiomer on drug utilization and market share of the 
original racemate and of overall utilisation of both products in the private South 
African pharmaceutical market was measured in the following ways: 
1. The volume of units sold of the original racemate and its generics in the year 
before the single enantiomer was introduced onto the market, the year the 
single enantiomer was launched and three years after the launch 
2. The total market rand value of each applicable drug that was sold in the year 
before the single enantiomer was launched, the year the single enantiomer 
was launched and three years after the launch. 
3. The total volume of units sold and sales of both the enantiomer and the 
racemate products on the market from the innovator company compared to 
other companies in the total drug molecule market (market share).  
4. The differences in company market share year on year as outlined above 
nationally 
5. The probability of the single enantiomer being prescribed over the racemate 
and its generics year on year. 
 
6. METHODS 
6.1  Data Source  
IMS Health is a global company that provides market-related information and data on 
prescriptions and sales to the pharmaceutical industry.  Permission to access this 
IMS database has been granted by a pharmaceutical company for the purposes of 
this research.  
A retrospective analysis of the IMS data for drug sales and volume of each single 
enantiomer in relation to its racemic originator (and generics) in the Total Private 
Market (TPM) was  conducted using Moving Annual Totals (MAT) from a year prior 
to launch until three years post-launch. 
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6.2 Data Range 
This study focussed on the drug utilization of three different drug substance pairs as 
outlined in Table 1.  
Table 1: Drug substance pairs 
Racemate Trade name Launch Date Single 
enantiomer 
Trade name Manufacturer Launch date
Omeprazole 
 
LOSEC® Feb. 1990 Esomeprazole NEXIAM® AstraZeneca (Pty) 
SA 
Apr. 2002 
Citalopram CIPRAMIL® Sep. 1994 Escitalopram CIPRALEX® Lundbeck 
Pharmaceuticals 
June 2004 
Cetirizine ZYRTEC® Jan. 1991 Levocetirizine 
 
XYZAL® UCB Pharma Aug. 2004 
 
These medicines were initially in the market as racemates and then later, the single 
enantiomer version of the medicine was launched into the market by the same 
pharmaceutical company. 
These original racemates – omeprazole (LOSEC®), citalopram (CIPRAMIL®) and 
cetirizine (ZYRTEC®) have since seen the introduction of their generics into the 
market.  
The following generics in Table 2 were available for the racemates during the study 
period (2001-2007): 
 
Table 2: Racemates and current generics  
Substance  Generic Manufacturer Launch date 
Omeprazole (LOSEC)  Adco-Omeprazole® Adcock Ingram Sep. 2004 
 Altosec® Aspen Jan. 2001 
 Lokit® Pharmascript July 2006 
 DRL-Omeprazole® Pharmaplan July 2005 
 Omez® Dr Reddy’s July 2004 
 Omiloc® Hexal Pharma Jan. 2005 
 Sandoz-Omeprazole® Sandoz Aug. 2004 
 Ulzec® Triomed ± 2000 
Citalopram (CIPRAMIL) Arrow-Citalopram® Arrow June 2010 
 Austell Citalopram® Austell Dec. 2006 
 Cilift® Aspen May 2003 
 Citalo Hexal® Hexal Pharma March 2005 
 Depramil® Cipla Medpro April 2005 
 Sandoz Citalopram® Sandoz Aug. 2005 
 Adco-Talomil® Adcock Ingram March 2003 
 Merck-Citalopram® Merck Generics April 2006 
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 Ran-Citalopram® Ranbaxy Sept. 2005 
 Cilate® Unicorn/ Betabs May 2007 
Cetirizine (ZYRTEC) Adco-Cetirizine® Adcock Ingram Aug. 2004 
 Allecet® Cipla Medpro June 2004 
 Allermine® Merck Generics/Mylan Oct. 2004 
 Aspen Cetirizine® Aspen April 2005 
 Austell Cetirizine® Austell April 2005 
 Betek® Be-Tabs March 2007 
 Sandoz Cetirizine® Sandoz Aug. 2004 
 Cetirizine Hexal® Sandoz Oct. 2004 
 Texa® Pharma Dynamics March 2003 
 Zyncet® Sekpharma Jan. 2006 
 UCB Cetirizine® UCB Pharma May 2003 
(IMS, 2013) 
IMS data was collected to analyse: 
1. The drug utilization and market share of the original racemate and its generics 
(Table 2 above) according to the volume of products sold as well as rand 
value of products sold the year prior to the introduction of the new single 
enantiomer version onto the market. 
2.  The drug utilization and market share of the single enantiomer drug 
compared to its racemates in the year the single enantiomer was launched 
according to the volume of products sold and rand value. 
3. Year on year differences in drug utilization and changes in company market 
share since the introduction of the single enantiomer onto the market until 
three years post-launch. 
4. Impact on the total volume and sales of both the enantiomer and the 
racemate products of the innovator company on the market (i.e. did it result in 
further market share for the company). 
5. The probability of the single enantiomer being prescribed/sold over the 
racemate and generics year on year. 
 
Exclusions to the data range procured from the IMS database are as follows: 
- Only the oral dosage form of esomeprazole and omeprazole (plus its 
generics) were used in this study. The intravenous (IV) dosage form 
has different indications for use and consequently is only used in a 
hospital setting. 
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- Only drug molecules identical to the originator molecule were analysed 
as opposed to all drug molecules belonging to the drug class (e.g. 
Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPIs), Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors 
(SSRIs) or H1-receptor antagonists). 
The single enantiomer version of citalopram, escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) has also 
come off patent. The generics currently available for escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) are 
presented in Table 3: 
Table 3: Escitalopram Generics 
Substance  Generic Manufacturer Launch Date 
Escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) Aspen Escitalopram
® Aspen Aug. 2009 
 Citraz® Dr Reddy’s Nov. 2008 
 Lexamil® Cipla Medpro May 2008 
 Mylan Escitalopram® Mylan March 2010 
 Zytomil® Pharma Dynamica Dec. 2010 
 Escitalopram Be-Tabs® Ranbaxy April 2011 
(IMS, 2013) 
A secondary analysis of escitalopram was conducted to determine the impact on 
drug utilization and market share once the single enantiomer drugs are also exposed 
to generic pressure. 
 
6.3 Data Management 
Information was extracted from the IMS database and exported to a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet (Appendix 1). 
This Microsoft Excel sheet contained the following the headings: 
- Drug Class 
- Dosage form 
- Name of Molecule 
- Name of Brand 
- Manufacturer name  
- Launch Date 
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- Pack size and Strength  
- Number of Units sold (Volume) per month 
- Rand value of sales per month 
- Price per unit pack size per month 
The annual Single Exit Price (SEP) increases have been applied to the data and the 
sales figures were automatically adjusted to reflect this. The pricing figures 
presented do not include dispensing fees. 
 
6.4 Statistical Analysis 
Microsoft Excel and data analysis and statistical software – IBM Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21.0 - was used to analyse the data collected. 
The descriptive statistical analysis included: 
1. Line graphs of each different single enantiomer based pharmaceutical product 
in relation to the originator racemate and its generics were plotted with time 
on the x-axis and volume of units sold on the y-axis to show the trend in drug 
utilization.  
2. Line graphs with time plotted on the x-axis and the rand value of sales on the 
y-axis to show the trend in sales of each applicable drug. 
A Moving Annual Total was used to smooth out the fluctuations so that the 
underlying direction of the trend could be determined. 
3. Market share (in both unit sales and rand value of sales) of the single 
enantiomer, originator racemate and it generics is expressed in pie charts 
illustrating each company’s contribution to the Total Private Market (TPM). 
 
4. Box and whisker plots of the racemate and its generics have been plotted for 
the year before the single enantiomer was launched, the year after its launch, 
two years after launch and three years after launch. 
Box and whisker plots graphically display distribution of data. In this study 
they are used to visually show the impact of the single enantiomer on the rand 
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and unit sales of the racemate and generics that were on the market before 
the single enantiomer product was launched. The whiskers (lines) represent 
the maximum and minimum unit sales/ rand sales. The box represents the 
interquartile range which is divided by the median line into the upper quartile 
and lower quartile.  
 
To ascertain the impact the single enantiomer made on the market, the data 
set used excluded not only the single enantiomer but also any racemates and 
generics launched after the introduction of the single enantiomer. This gives a 
true reflection of what impact the single enantiomer made to the existing 
market. 
Due to the small population size, the mean can be distorted by one or two 
observations where the volume of unit sales or value of rand sales were 
exceptionally high or low - it was therefore more appropriate to use the 
median when there was skewness observed in the data. 
Maximum unit/ rand 
sales
Lower Quartile
Median
Upper Quartile
Minimum unit/ rand 
sales
In addition, the following inferential statistical method was applied to the data: 
1. Probability 
Probability is defined by Olofsson (2005) as the “mathematics of randomness” 
and is a method of predicting an outcome where there are uncertainties. This 
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study makes use of objective or experimental probability where the relative 
frequency of a certain event occurring is measured by the formula: 
௡݂ = 	
ܵ௡
݊  
Where fn is the relative frequency, Sn is the number of times the event 
occurred, and n is the total number of outcomes (Olofsson, 2005). 
 
The probability of the enantiomer being prescribed/ sold instead of the 
racemate at different time points namely, the year the single enantiomer was 
launched and then one, two and three years post launch has been calculated 
using the following formula: 
Units	of	Single	Enantiomer	(SE)	sold	1/	2/	3	year(s)	after	launch
Total	units	of	SE + Racemates	sold	1/	2/	3	year(s)after	launch  
 
 
The probability of the single enantiomer being prescribed or sold increases as 
the probability percentage increases. 
 
This calculation demonstrates whether the drug utilization of the single 
enantiomer increased or decreased from introduction until three years 
subsequent to its launch.  
 
6.5 Study Limitations 
The IMS database reflects the private sector only and is therefore a limitation to the 
scope of this study. 
Drug molecules identical to the originator molecule were analysed as opposed to all 
drug molecules belonging to the drug class (e.g. Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPIs), 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) or H1-receptor antagonists). 
IMS data further back than November 2001 could not be accessed; consequently, 
values were annualized for omeprazole data a year before launch (2002) where 
statistical comparisons were made using annual totals.  
The influence of marketing strategies that could have been employed to prescribers 
and/or consumers was not investigated for the purposes of this study. 
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7. RESULTS 
7.1 Omeprazole-Esomeprazole Case Study 
7.1.1 Entry of Esomeprazole onto Market 
The originator molecule, LOSEC® MUPS launched in February 1990 dominated the 
market prior to the launch of NEXIAM® launched in April 2002  by the same 
pharmaceutical manufacturer – AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals (Pty) Ltd. 
It is clear from Figure 5 that after the launch of the esomeprazole molecule 
(NEXIAM®) on the market there was a steady increase in the volume of prescriptions 
written in favour of esomeprazole.  
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Figure 5: Impact of esomeprazole (NEXIAM®) on unit sales in omeprazole market 
 
The introduction of omeprazole generics such as ADCO-OMEPRAZOLE®, SANDOZ 
OMEPRAZOLE® and OMEZ® in early 2004 saw a decrease in both unit and a rand 
sale for LOSEC® but there was still a steady increase of NEXIAM® sales. 
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Interesting to note here is the presence of ULZEC®, another omeprazole product, 
launched while LOSEC® was still under patent. This alleged violation on patent right 
was challenged by AstraZeneca and lost. An appeal to this decision was made to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of South Africa in September 2002 (The Supreme Court 
of Appeal of South Africa, Case 63/2002) and the final judgement ruled that there 
was indeed an infringement on the patent and Triomed Pty (Ltd) was ordered to 
cease the sale of ULZEC® – not before they had succeeded in taking a substantial 
market share. 
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Figure 6: Impact of esomeprazole (NEXIAM®) on rand sales in omeprazole market 
 
7.1.2 Impact of Esomeprazole on Market Share 
Triomed’s launch of ULZEC® saw the company gain approximately a quarter of the 
omeprazole market from Astrazeneca in both rand sales and units in the year before 
the launch of NEXIAM®. This stayed steady until the end of the first year post launch.  
The withdrawal of ULZEC® from the market allowed AstraZeneca to claim almost the 
entire market share of the omeprazole/esomeprazole market by the end of the 
second year. It was only during the third year after the launch of the single 
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enantiomer, NEXIAM®, that five other pharmaceutical companies launched generics 
of the racemate, omeprazole, onto the market. The entry of these products reduced 
AstraZeneca’s market share by 23% in unit sales and only 12% in rand sales. 
Unit sales 
74.94%
25.06%
ASTRAZENECA
TRIOMED
73.04%
26.96%
ASTRAZENECA
TRIOMED
   
 
99.94%
0.06%
ASTRAZENECA
TRIOMED
76.82%
0.00%
5.86%
2.94%
4.08%
0.84%
9.46% ASTRAZENECA
TRIOMED
SANDOZ
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
DR REDDYS LABS
HEXAL PHARMA
ADCO-GENERICS
(b) Company market share (unit sales) one 
year after the launch of esomeprazole – 
May 2002 to April 2003 
(a) Company market share (unit sales) 
one year before the launch of esomeprazole 
– May 2001 to April 2002 
  
 
 
(d) Company market share (unit sales) three 
years after the launch of esomeprazole – 
May 2004 to April 2005
(c) Company market share (unit sales) two 
years after the launch of esomeprazole – 
May 2003 to April 2004 
Figure 7: Impact of esomeprazole on market share (Unit sales) 
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 Rand sales 
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(b) Company market share (rand sales) one 
year after the launch of esomeprazole – 
May 2002 to April 2003 
(a) Company market share (rand sales) one 
year before the launch of esomeprazole 
– May 2001 to April 2002 
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(d) Company market share (rand sales) 
three years after the launch of 
esomeprazole – May 2004 to April 2005 
(c) Company market share (rand sales) two   
years after the launch of esomeprazole – May 
2003 to April 2004 
 
Figure 8: Impact of esomeprazole on market share (Rand sales) 
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7.1.3 Impact of Esomeprazole on Existing Racemates 
Figure 9 and 10 represent the existing omeprazoles on the market before the launch 
of NEXIAM® which  consisted only of ULZEC® and LOSEC® . The median of unit and 
rand sales increased one year after the launch of the single enantiomer and then fell 
dramatically to zero after three years post-launch. 
This does not represent an organic decline in drug utilization and sales by 
consumers of the racemate but rather the result of the patent infringement lawsuit 
that was on-going at the time. 
 
Unit Sales 
 
Figure 9: Impact of esomeprazole on existing racemates (Unit sales)  
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Rand sales 
 
Figure 10: Impact of esomeprazole on existing racemates (Rand sales) 
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7.1.4 Probability of Esomeprazole being Prescribed or Sold after Launch  
Compared to Total Omeprazole/ Esomeprazole Market 
 
The proportion of esomeprazole (single enantiomer) units sold of the total molecule 
market (single enantiomer, racemate and generics) is compared year on year to 
determine if there was an increase or decrease of use of esomeprazole since its 
launch into the market.  
Table 4: Probability of esomeprazole being prescribed or sold after launch compared to total 
omeprazole/ esomeprazole market 
Probability of SE prescribed 
year after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
two years after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
three years after launch 
 
34.6% 
 
61.4% 
 
59.3% 
 
The probability that doctors prescribed esomeprazole in favour of any of the other 
racemates increased by 26.8% between the first and second years after NEXIAM® 
was launched. The probability took a slight dip of 2.1% in the third year post-launch. 
See Appendix 2 for more details 
 
7.2 Citalopram-Escitalopram Case Study 
7.2.1 Entry of Escitalopram on the Market 
CIPRAMIL®, the originator citalopram racemate, had already come off patent and 
was under huge generic pressure from CILIFT® and ADCO-TALOMIL® when the 
escitalopram medicine (CIPRALEX®) was launched in June 2004.  
CILIFT® continued to dominate the market and surpass not only CIPRAMIL® unit 
sales but also the growing CIPRALEX® product.  
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Figure 11: Impact of escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) on unit sales in citalopram market 
 
CILIFT®, manufactured and marketed by Aspen, had the largest volume of units sold 
but as can be seen from the graph above, their rand sales decreased when 
CIPRALEX® came onto the market. An analysis of CIILFT®’s unit price provides an 
explanation: A pack of 30 x CILIFT® 20 mg tablets were initially launched into the 
market at R152.00 in May 2003. The price per unit pack steadily decreased from 
May 2004 until it reached a price of just R43.80 per pack by November 2005. They 
therefore sold the largest volume of units in this period but because of the substantial 
dropping of their price their rand sales plummeted. 
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Figure 12: Impact of escitalopram (CIPRALEX®) on rand sales in citalopram market 
 
7.2.2 Impact of Escitalopram on Market Share 
In the year before escitalopram was launched, Lundbeck had 40% of market share in 
terms of units sold and 52% of rand sales in the market. Its closest generic 
competitor was Aspen who had a share of 58% in terms of units but just 47% of the 
rand sales in the citalopram market. 
The launch of the single enantiomer proved to be very successful for Lundbeck. With 
the addition of CIPRALEX® to its portfolio, Lundbeck was able to able to secure 5% 
more of the market share in units and its rand sales in the market increased by 8% at 
the end of its first year of launch. 
After the second year of escitalopram’s entry on the market, Lundbeck had a 
considerable market share with 75% of rand sales. 
Lundbeck continued to lead the market the following year, increasing a further 2% in 
rand sales to gain 77% of the market share. 
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(b) Company market share (unit sales) one 
year after the launch of escitalopram – 
May 2004 to April 2005 
(a) Company market share (unit sales) one 
year before the launch of escitalopram – 
May 2003 to April 2004 
 
 
 
(d) Company market share (unit sales) three 
years after the launch of escitalopram – 
May 2006 to April 2007 
(c) Company market share (unit sales) two 
years after the launch of escitalopram – 
May 2005 to April 2006 
 Figure 13: Impact of escitalopram on market share (Unit sales) 
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(d) Company market share (rand sales) 
three years after the launch of 
escitalopram – May 2006 to April 2007 
(c) Company market share (rand sales) 
two years after the launch of 
escitalopram – May 2005 to April 2006 
Figure 14: Impact of escitalopram on market share (Rand sales 
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7.2.3 Impact of Escitalopram on Existing Racemates 
There were three racemates that were on the market prior to the launch of 
escitalopram. The three racemates represented in Figure 15 and 16 are: CLIFT®, 
CIPRAMIL® and ADCO-TALOMIL®. The launch of the single enantiomer caused a 
steady decrease in the median of both unit sales and rand sales which levelled off 
marginally between the second and third year post-launch of the single enantiomer. 
It is interesting to note that the maximum unit sales for the racemates continued to 
grow through the study period. The minimum unit sales also increased. 
There was a very large difference between the minimum rand sales and the median 
in the year before launch of CIPRALEX®, the single enantiomer. This gap was 
reduced in the year post launch as the median decreased and the minimum rand 
sales picked up. The median fell further in the second year and held steady until the 
third year. 
Unit Sales 
 
Figure 15: Impact of escitalopram on existing racemates (Unit sales) 
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 Rand Sales 
 
Figure 16: Impact of escitalopram on existing racemates (Rand sales) 
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7.2.4 Probability of Escitalopram being Prescribed or Sold after Launch  
 Compared to Total Citalopram/ Escitalopram market 
 
There seemed to be a gradual increase in the probability of the single enantiomer 
CIPRALEX® being prescribed through the study period over the racemic citalopram 
products. 
 
Table 5: Probability of escitalopram being prescribed or sold after launch compared to total 
citalopram/ escitalopram market 
Probability of SE prescribed 
year after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
two years after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
three years after launch 
 
23.9% 
 
36.2% 
 
37.1% 
 
See Appendix 2 for more details 
 
7.2.5 Secondary Analysis:  
What Happens to the Single Enantiomer Product Once there is Generic Entry 
In May 2008, Cipla Medpro launched LEXAMIL®, a generic version of Lundbeck’s 
CIPRALEX® that was still under patent. Cipla Medpro argued the validity of Patent 
89/4476 citing lack of novelty, obviousness and insufficiency. Lundbeck’s appeal 
included a proposal to amend claims stated in its patent and for an interdict to stop 
Cipla Medpro from continuing with their intended launch. On 20th June 2008 in the 
Court for the Commissioner of Patents, the presiding judge ruled that the patent 
could not be amended at such a late stage and the application for the interdict was 
dismissed (Court for the Commissioner of Patents, Case 89/4476). 
LEXAMIL® was therefore able to continue being marketed and sold by Cipla Medpro 
much to the detriment of CIPRALEX® unit and rand sales, the results of which are 
evident in Figure 17 and Figure 18 below. 
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Figure 17: Impact of escitalopram generic entry on CIPRALEX® unit sales 
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Figure 18: Impact of escitalopram generic entry on CIPRALEX® rand sales 
47 
CIPRALEX® continued to be a blockbuster drug for its innovator company, 
Lundbeck, until the end of April 2008. Following the court dismissal of Lundbeck’s 
application to prevent Cipla from launching its escitalopram generic, the monopolistic 
market share Lundbeck held of the escitalopram market quickly diminished. 
After the first year of launch of LEXAMIL®, Cipla took 32% of unit sales and a 25% of 
rand sales away from Lundbeck. 
At the end of the second year after the patent for escitalopram was invalidated, two 
more generics manufactured by Dr Reddy’s and Aspen Pharmacare was launched. 
Cipla, however, continued to show steady growth in the market with 48% of unit 
sales and 42% of rand sales. 
The following year, many other generics entered the escitalopram market – Cipla’s 
LEXAMIL® was still a firm favourite, with just under half (49%) of the total units of 
escitalopram sold and 45% of the rand sales. Lundbeck’s unit sales and rand sales 
decreased to 38% and 46% respectively. 
Lundbeck’s market share continued to plunge under generic competition by the end 
of the fourth year resulting in just 30% of the total units of escitalopram sold and 39% 
of the total rand sales in the market.   
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(c) Company market share (unit sales) two 
years after escitalopram patent 
expiration
(d) Company market share (unit sales) 
three years after escitalopram patent 
expiration
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Figure 19: Impact of generic entry on market share after patent expiry of escitalopram (Unit sales) 
(e) Company market share (unit sales) four 
years after escitalopram patent expiration 
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Figure 20: Impact of generic entry on market share after patent expiry of escitalopram (Rand sales) 
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7.3 Cetirizine-Levocetirizine Case Study 
 
7.3.1 Entry of Levocetirizine on the Market 
In contrast to the preceding two examples of prescription medications, the over-the-
counter (OTC) market shows more variation between the different brands.  
The number of units sold of ZYRTEC®, the original racemate product, dropped upon 
the arrival of the single enantiomer, XYZAL®, into the market in August 2004. 
TEXA® (a cetirizine generic), however, grew in unit sales during the review period. A 
possible reason for this can be attributed to the decrease in its purchase price 
making it more affordable and attractive to th
tablets was sold at R89.12 when it was first released on the market in March 2003 – 
this price decreased to just R32.63 – less than half its original value by February 
2007. This also explains why the rand sales graph below shows a dip for TEXA® 
sales in spite of the growth of its sales in unit packs. 
igure 21: Impact of levocetirizine (XYZAL®) on unit sales in cetirizine market 
e consumer. A pack of 30 x 10 mg 
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ZYRTEC® experienced a large drop in sales when XYZAL®, its single enantiomer 
king 
Figure 22: Impact of levocetirizine (XYZAL®) on rand sales in cetirizine market 
 
7.3.2 Impact of Levocetirizine on Market Share  
The patent for the original racemate cetirizine (ZYRTEC®) manufactured by UCB had 
already expired some time before the launch of its single enantiomer, levocetirizine 
from the same innovator company. Cipla clearly led the cetirizine market with 70% of 
the total unit sales and 65% of total rand sales. 
The entry of levocetirizine managed to boost UCB’s market share in rand sales but 
. 
he mark t share was distributed amongst the many generics that were launched 
counterpart from the same innovator company (UCB Pharma) was launched. 
 XYZAL® showed steady growth in the three years following its launch, overta
the leading cetirizine generic, TEXA®, in rand sales but not in unit sales. 
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not in the amount of units sold at the end of its first year of launch
T e
during the second year after the launch of XYZAL®, more evident in the unit sales 
52 
than the rand sales. UCB still had the majority of the market with 46% of the total 
rand sales. 
At the end of the third year of this study, Pharmadynamics had sold 325 841 units of 
TEXA®, giving it a 31% market share in terms of units sold but, due to its pricing 
strategy, only had 17% of the market in terms of rand sales. The sale of its single 
enantiomer medicine allowed UCB to keep the majority of the market share with 43% 
of rand sales for the market. 
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Unit sales 
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Figure 23: Impact of levocetirizine on market share (Unit sales) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
59.06%
1.45%
39.49%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
28.77%
15.97%
25.22%
18.94%
3.93%
4.41%
1.96% 0.60%
0.21%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
(a)    Company market share (unit sales) one 
year before the launch of levocetirizine 
(b) Company market share (unit sales) one 
year after the launch of levocetirizine – 
Se– September 2003 to August 2004 ptember 2004 to August 2005 
 
21.54%
12.49%
25.70%
16.60%
4.65%
3.87%
4.63% 7.47%
2.86% 0.18%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
18.93%
11.18%
33.82%
14.97%
3.66%
3.98%
2.99%
6.86%
1.01% 2.30%
0.30%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
(c) Company market share (unit sales) two 
years after the launch of levocetirizine – 
Se
(d) Company market share (unit sales) three 
years after the launch of levocetirizine – 
September 2005 to August 2006 ptember 2006 to August 2007 
Rand sales 
 
 
e on market share (Rand sales) 
 
  
66.78%
0.64%
32.57%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
53.93%
10.85%
21.44%
8.36%
2.35%
1.98%
0.80%
0.22%
0.07%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
 
 
(a) Company market share (rand sales) one 
year before the launch of levocetirizine – 
(b) Company market share (rand sales) one 
year after the launch of levocetirizine – 
September 2003 to August 2004 September 2004 to August 2005 
 
51.37%
10.65%
17.13%
8.96%
3.42%
1.96%
1.95%
3.28%
1.12%
0.15%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
49.41%
10.44%
19.34%
8.55%
2.74%
1.71%
1.41%
3.52%
0.65%
2.10%
0.13%
U C B
CIPLA-MEDPRO
PHARMA
DYNAMICS
ADCO-GENERICS
HEXAL PHARMA
SANDOZ
MERCK GENERICS
ASPEN P/CARE GEN
 
 
(c) Company market share (rand sales) two (d) Company market share (rand sales) three 
years after the launch of levocetirizine –
Se
 years after the launch of levocetirizine – 
September 2006 to August 2007 ptember 2005 to August 2006 
Figure 24: Impact of levocetirizin
 
 
 
 
 
55 
7.3.3 Impact of Levocetirizine on Existing Racemates. 
The launch of the single enantiomer, XYZAL® did not have a substantial effect on the 
unit sales of the four racemates that were available on the market – ZYRTEC®, UCB 
CETIRIZINE®, ALLECET®, and TEXA® (represented in Figure 25 and 26). The 
median increased slightly, and the maximum rose to a large extent during the study 
period. 
The rand sales median decreased a year after the single enantiomer was introduced 
on the market but then picked up in the following years, although the maximum rand 
sales did show a decline each year. 
 
nit Sales 
igure 25: Impact of levocetirizine on existing racemates (Unit sales) 
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Rand Sales 
 
Figure 26: Impact of levocetirizine on existing racemates (Rand sales) 
 
7.3.4 Probability of Levocetirizine being Prescribed or Sold after Launch  
Compared to Total Cetirizine/ Levocetirizine Market 
 
The probability of XYZAL®, the single enantiomer, being sold to patients increased 
by 1.4% between the first and second years and then slightly again by 0.7% between 
the second and third years post-launch. 
Table 6: Probability of levocetirizine being prescribed or sold after launch compared to total cetirizine/ 
levocetirizine market 
Probability of SE prescribed 
year after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
two years after launch 
Probability of SE prescribed 
three years after launch 
 
5.1% 
 
6.5% 
 
7.2% 
 
See Appendix 2 for more details  
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8. DISCUSSION 
In the case of both the prescription-only esomeprazole and escitalopram molecules 
entering the market, an increase in utilization of the single enantiomer compared to 
its generics and original racemate were seen in the trend graphs reflecting unit sales.  
The results from the study of esomeprazole showed that there was a clear 
dominance of esomeprazole in both the number of units sold as well the rand sales 
in that market in the years following its introduction. “Chiral switching” in this case 
proved not only to bring a perceived increase in clinical efficacy and safety but also a 
winning financial strategy for the innovator pharmaceutical company. Agranat et al 
(2002) lists esomeprazole as one of the most successful chiral switches worldwide. 
A case study conducted in the Netherlands regarding the switch patterns of 
omeprazole pre- and post- patent expiry showed that most patients (were switched 
from omeprazole to esomeprazole post patent expiry compared to pre-patent expiry 
where patients on omeprazole were primarily switched to pantoprazole. The findings 
troduction of esomeprazole on the market and could have occurred irrespective of 
Escital  drug utilization. The 
growth of ecitalopram utilization was also reflected in the probability calculations 
scribed drug of choice during the study 
ow that ther ercept g 
ore beneficial than the race ate, citalopram, as there was a steady increase of 
riptions in favour of CIP X® dispensed – but perhaps not as convincing to 
ad the market in terms of units sold. The strategy from a business focus definitely 
ough cannibalising its own originator racemate, 
CIPRAMIL®, to a certain extent - there was an increase in market share in both unit 
sales and rand sales for the company due to sales of both the racemate and its 
single enantiomer products. 
suggest that the increase in switch behaviour could have been attributed to the 
in
patent expiry (Klok et al, 2006). 
opram’s entry onto the market showed a strong growth in
showing an increase in the units of the single enantiomer drug prescribed and sold 
instead of racemate drugs year on year after its launch. A citalopram generic, 
however, still continued to lead as the pre
period. The escitalopram molecule overtook the citalopram generic in rand sales due 
to its higher price.  
These results sh e could have been a p ion of escitalopram bein
m m
presc RALE
le
worked in Lundbeck’s favour, alth
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The secondary analysis looking at the effect on drug utilization and rand sales once 
 
 
or a 
ght 20 mg F.C (film coated) tablets. 
es – 
ket 
 
g 
nt. 
h to yet another generic due to their lack of knowledge 
the generics of the single enantiomer, escitalopram, were launched onto the market 
shows how the generic surpassed the original single enantiomer in both drug 
utilization and rand sales. 
In general, generics make up the vast majority of usage in South Africa - almost 60% 
of medicines consumed in the private sector are generics (Ribbink, 2011). 
A major contributing factor to this statistic could be that pharmacists in South Africa
are obligated by legislation to offer generic substitution to a patient in order to make 
healthcare as affordable as possible. In addition, many medical schemes enforce 
generic usage, where possible, through the use of formularies or benefit design with
the member having to pay a co-payment if they wish to use the originator product. 
CIPRALEX® could have either been prescribed less by doctors in comparison to 
LEXAMIL®, or substituted for the generic version at the pharmacy level. 
One of the key factors that can explain this result is the difference in price between 
the molecules. LEXAMIL was launched onto the market at a price of R118.860 f
pack of thirty 20 mg F. C (film coated) tablets in comparison to CIPRALEX®’s 
R366.140 for a pack of twenty ei
A recent study conducted by Kaplan et al (2013) analysed the relationship between 
market share volumes of generic and innovator medicines of 19 low to middle 
income countries from 2001 to 2011. Out of nine countries that were selected for 
analysis, South Africa was found to have the largest number of Top 30 medicin
which included citalopram and omeprazole- where the increase in the generic mar
share of the medicine was greater than the decrease in market share of the 
innovator.  
 The secondary analysis also highlights the importance of patent protection for the 
innovator company and the impact a “first-to market” generic can make to its sales
and profits. Hollis (2002) evaluated the effect of the timing of generic entry had on 
ethical drug sales in Canada over a four year period – the results showed that the 
first generic to be marketed usually had an enduring competitive advantage, gainin
approximately 30% of market share. The author, after interviewing several 
pharmacists, attributed this to a ‘switching cost’ for both the pharmacist and patie
Patients are reluctant to switc
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on bio-equivalence. Pharmacists have little incentive to switch patients as there is 
not much perceived difference across generics and often times the dispensing fee 
remains the same. Pharmacies usually stock only one or two brands of generi
order to reduce inventory c
cs in 
osts. 
ld very 
consumer 
also have imperfect information as they are usually less informed than health 
 
’s 
The aggressive stance taken by generic companies to gain market share from 
innovator companies is also apparent in this case study. Similar results cou
well be seen within the omeprazole/ esomeprazole market when the impending 
NEXIAM® brand reaches patent expiration.  
Marketing of prescription drugs is a complex interaction between pharmaceutical 
companies, prescribers, patients, regulators and third-party payers with most 
marketing efforts directed at health professionals in the form of “detailing’ visits by 
sales representatives and print advertising in medical journals. In contrast, OTC 
medicines are less dependent on the role of the prescriber and direct-to-
advertising is allowed. OTC products are generally considered to be “experience” 
rather than “search” goods and as such there is strong brand loyalty. If a consumer 
experiences benefits from a particular medicine (idiosyncratic reaction), they are 
usually reluctant to try any other alternative medicine (risk aversion). Consumers will 
professionals about its efficacy and appropriate uses of other OTC products. Risk 
aversion and imperfect information can lead to high switching costs and confer
important roles such as quality on brand names (Ling et al, 2002). 
Antihistamines such as cetirizine and other OTC medications are generally not 
funded by medical schemes and so they are paid out of pocket by the patient who 
may be more price-sensitive.  
These influences could have been responsible for the distinct difference in the 
results of the cetirizine-levocetirizine market compared to the prescription only case 
studies. 
 If there is an established innovator brand favoured by consumers or pharmacists, 
generic companies have to drop their price margins substantially in order to gain 
market share,  as is evidenced by the results observed in the case of Aspen
TEXA®. TEXA®, a cetirizine generic, managed to lead the market slightly in terms of 
volume of units sold due to its pricing strategy. The results of volume of units sold 
60 
demonstrate that although there was growth observed for XYZAL®, there was no 
significant change to the consumer’s or pharmacist’s perception of increased clinica
efficacy of the single enantiomer – or, perhaps, the low price of the cetirizine 
generics was more of a deciding 
l 
factor when choosing in favour of cetirizine over 
® 
g 
 utilized here also proved successful 
at 
ion, 
The South African pharmaceutical market is a dynamic field in which pricing 
  
levocetirizine. 
UCB, the innovator company, manufacturing both ZYRTEC® (cetirizine) and XYZAL
(levocetirizine) managed to increase its market share in rand sales demonstratin
once again that the “chiral-switching” strategy
for the innovator company. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
The results, are consistent with the literature (Hutt and Valentova, 2003; Agranat et 
al, 2002; Tucker, 2000) that deems “chiral switching” to be a successful strategy th
allows the innovator company to retain the majority of the market share in its drug 
class and extend the lifecycle of the product.  
The three case studies showed that single enantiomer molecules of an already 
marketed racemic pharmaceutical product did make an impact on drug utilizat
generally showing an upward trend following its launch, indicating that there is a 
perceived belief of enhanced clinical outcomes for the patient, albeit to differing 
degrees.  
There are, however, many influencing factors specific to each market that make it 
difficult to draw a general conclusion from the case studies.  
strategies, prescription status, marketing efforts to physicians and/or consumers and 
patent challenges make each case study unique.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      0 0 0.00
MNF 
(MANUFACTURER)
LDATE     
(LAUNCH DAT
   
E)
MTH
 (VOLUME O
MON
UN
/5/03
F UNITS SOLD 
THLY)
R
MTH/5/03
 (RAND VALUE OF 
SALES MONTHLY)
R/HP
MTH/5/03
 (PRICE PER PACK)
 N6A4  SSRI ANTIDEPRESSANTS (DRUG CLASS)  30 616 7 165 675 234.05
   CITALOPRAM (NAME OF MOLECULE)  30 616 7 165 675 234.05
     ASPEN P/CARE GEN (COMPANY)  0 0 0.00
       CILIFT (NAME OF BRAND) A&G 5/2003 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30 (DOSAGE FORM, STRENGTH & PACK SIZE)  0 0 0.00
     LUNDBECK  30 616 7 165 675 234.05
       CIPRAMIL LUN 9/1994 30 616 7 165 675 234.05
         TABS 20MG 28  30 616 7 165 675 234.05
     ADCO-GENERICS  0 0 0.00
       ADCO-TALOMIL AOJ 3/2004 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30  0 0 0.00
     CIPLA-MEDPRO  0 0 0.00
       DEPRAMIL CD8 4/2005 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30  0 0 0.00
         TABS 40MG 30  0 0 0.00
     HEXAL PHARMA  0 0 0.00
       CITALOHEXAL HEX 4/2005 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30  0 0 0.00
MERCK GENERICS
       MERCK-CITALOPRAM M/G 4/2006 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30  0 0 0.00
     RANBAXY  0 0 0.00
       RAN-CITALOPRAM RBY 9/2005 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 28  0 0 0.00
         TABS 40MG 28  0 0 0.00
     SANDOZ  0 0 0.00
       SANDOZ CITALOPRAM SDZ 8/2005 0 0 0.00
         TABS 20MG 30  0 0 0.00
         TABS 40MG 30  0 0 0.00
   ESCITALOPRAM  0 0 0.00
     LUNDBECK  0 0 0.00
       CIPRALEX LUN 6/2004 0 0 0.00
         TABS 10MG 28  0 0 0.00
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APPENDIX 2 
Probability calculations 
Esomeprazole: Units of single enantiomer sold year after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold year after launch 
=  
��� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.346 or 34.6% probability 
 
 Units of single enantiomer sold two years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold two years after launch 
 
=  
��� ���
��� ���
 
 
=  0.614 or 61.4% probability Units of single enantiomer sold three years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold three years after launch 
 
=  
��� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.593 or 59.3% probability 
 
Escitalopram: Units of single enantiomer sold year after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold year after launch 
=  
��� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.239 or 23.9% probability 
 Units of single enantiomer sold two years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold two years after launch 
 
=  
��� ���
� ��� ��� 
 
=  0.362 or 36.2% probability 
 
 Units of single enantiomer sold three years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold three years after launch 
 
=  
��� ���
� ��� ��� 
 
=  0.371 or 37.1% probability 
 
Levocetirizine: 
 Units of single enantiomer sold year after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold year after launch 
=  
�� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.051 or 5.1% probability 
 Units of single enantiomer sold two years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold two years after launch 
 
=  
�� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.065 or 6.5% probability 
 
 Units of single enantiomer sold three years after launchTotal units of SE + Racemates sold three years after launch 
 
=  
�� ���
��� ��� 
 
=  0.072 or 7.2% probability 
 
 
